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ABSTRAK
Kt'rtClS ini Inelnbincangkan iSll per,Hllran, pasaran dan buclCl\'a sL'bagai asas kawalan. Secara khuslis ianva cuba
Inl'l~icl\r<lh persoalan len tang- "hagailnana sistelll kawalan pen"gurusan scscbllah organisasi illl berkelllb,:ng clan
bertubr dcngan beredarnya masa" K;~ian ini dijalankan dalam sebuah syarikat tele\'isyen di UK dan data-
data elllpirikal diperolchi dari saw proses peugutipan y'ang berjalan selama lapan belas bulan. Dari analisis
~'ang dibllat. kalni dapat Illencadangk<\I1 yang sistenl kawabn pengllrusan berkelnballg kearah penggantungan
kcpada ka"'alan \ang berasasbn pcraturan dan pasaran dan bukan kepada kawalan yang berasaskan budaya.
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the issue of rules. markets and culture as bases of contro\. In particular, it seeks to
address the question of 'huw does the management c011lrol svtelll (VIeS) of an organization change O\'er
lime" .-\ te!e\'isioll cOlllpany ill the UK provided the selling for the study, and empirical data "'ere gathered
during IH Illonths offield research. From the c\'idence gathered we were able 10 sUf(geslthat the \,ICS evolved
to\\'ards increasing reliance on rules and 1l1arkels and Ilot controls based (}11 organizational culture.
INTRODUCTION
A management control system is a mechanism
used by top managers to channel behaviour and
actions of members in ways favourable to, or in
congruence with, predetermined goals or
objectives of the organization. In management
and organizational literature, scholars such as
Quchi (1980) and Lebas and Weigenstein (1986)
have suggested that top managers can rely on
rule-, market- or culture-based control to seek
compliance of their subordinates.
Rule-based Control
The essence of rule-based control is the control
of functional operations of the organization
through procedures and bureaucratic
arrangements. The focus is on identifying
entitlements based on status or position. Hence,
rule-based control is associated with evaluations
to ensure that COtTect procedures are followed
(Thompson and Wildavsky 1986).
In practice, rule-based control is concerned
with maintaining the existing social order as
determined by top management. It relies on the
use of data or of reports to evaluate existing
operational tasks so that operating managers'
actions are in line with top managers' set policies.
It is in this respect that standardized and
elaborate formal operating procedures such as
budgets can be used as a means to ensure that
members behave and become more 'company-
oriented' individuals.
lVfarket-lJased Control
Market analysis sees organizations as striving
towards maximum efficiency with action values
being determined by market forces. Controls
are linked with efforts to determine how
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resources are related to the 'bottom line', i,e,
profit or reduced costs, Howe\'er, because
information is costly and not unrestricted, human
cognition is limited, and decision-makers'
preferences differ, an organization satisfies rather
than maximizes (Simon 1957),
As such, in a market-based management
control system, control actions are directed
lO\I'ards overseeing equitable exchanges and the
effective use of' limited resources,
Decentralization and the creation of separate
responsibility centres which are linked by transfer
prices become popular modes of control. In
Slllll, market forces are seen as legitimate factors
in determining the profitability of exchanges
(Ouchi 1980; Lebas and v\'eigenstein 1986).
Culture-based Control
Se\'eral scholars ha\'e suggested that culture can
also be an important control element. Ouchi
(l980) argued that organizations can, in some
instances, rely to a great extent on the patterns
of their socialization processes as the principal
control mechanism, Boisot (1986) suggested that
because culture codifies knowledge, the
phenomenal worlel can be compressed into a set
of relationships or messages which form the
'prm'ince of meaning' that 'guides the selection
processes to produce a familiar and manageable
\\'Orld' ,
In culture-based control, controls are linked
to core beliefs and values that members hold in
common and to which they subscribe collectively,
These beliefs and values have developed over
time and form the 'realities' in which they have
to operate, and, by doing so, become the
'invincible rules' that govern their behaviour. In
short, these core beliefs and values become 'a
system of mean ings' wh ich not only condi tions
but also shapes organizational behaviour (Whipp
1'1 (fl. 1989), As Geertz (1973: 44) said, 'Culture
is best seen not as complexes of concrete
behaviour patterns - Cllstoms, usages, traditions,
habit clusters - as have, by and large, been the
case up to now, but as a set of control
mechanisms - plans, recipes, rules, instructions
(which computer engineers call "programs")
for the governing of behaviollr.'
lAms ((!1d \\Ipigl'llsll'i!1 \ Mor/I'l o!ivl((!1agPIIlI'III Control
.\\SII'III (iVICS) Clwllgl'
Based on Ouchi's (l 980) distinction between
rules, markets and clans as the bases on which
an organization's iVICS rests, Lebas and
'I\'eigenstein (1986) put forward several
arguments. One of these was that an organization
will con ti n uously adapt its rnanagemen t control
system to its operating environment. This
adaptation process is dynamic, with the
organization defining its own balance between
the three elements - rules, market and culture,
depending on changes 'in the overall culture(s),
in technology and in the competitive forces' (p.
259). The point where the three meet can be
mapped against a 'triangular' continuum as shown
in Fig. 1.
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(Source: l.ebas and v\'eigenstein, 19H6: 26~)
Further, Lebas and Weigenstein argued that
an organization will rely on market control if it
depends on external economic forces, such as
the rules of supply and demand, to control
behaviour of its members. The most important
components of control \\'ill include transfer
pricing and bargaining, reinforced by standard
operating procedures such as budgets. Rule-
based control, on the other hand, couples
reliance on standardized ex-ente procedures
with other ex-post information systems to
monitor outcomes and performance. MCS based
on culture will also rely on internalized values
imbedded in the socialization process of the
organization.
Their thesis that culture can be a
mechanism for control is based on the premise
that traditions and occupational group solidarity
can regulate relations, prornote common goals
and shared expecrations about roles and
behaviour, and thereby prmide harmony of
interests, reduce perceptual differences and
minimize the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour.
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They also argued that market-based control
is the best alternative for an organization
operating decentralized and autonomous units.
On the other hand, an organization which
establishes clear relationships (of and between
its members and subunits) will benefit from
rules on channelling behaviour. Finally, in
situations where causal relationships are difficult
to identify, uncertainties are high and
communications amongst organizational
members are difficult to co-ordinate, an MCS
based on culture is the most appropriate.
They noted that there is no one base of
control that is better for all situations. However,
because greater environmental uncertainties and
advancement in technology will promote new
attitudes and more complex interactions in
working arrangements, an organization will need
an environment which will allow entrepreneurial
spirit and leadership style which can motivate
behaviour. Hence, Lebas and v\'eigenstein
proposed 'the general evolution of the MCS is
seen to be moving towards a lessening of the
importance of rule-based controls and towards
an increased reliance on controls imbedded in
the organizational culture' (p. 259).
RESEARCH METHOD
This study was made in order to understand the
dynamics of change and the implications of
accounting in the process. More specifically, it
sought to observe whether or not the change
model proposed by Lebas and Weigenstein
described above is applicable in practice. The
focus was on budgets and the processes of
budgeting in a commercial television company
in the United Kingdom.
The research was carried out as both an
exploratory and explanatory case study. The
method suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967)
was adopted. Data were collected through
interviews with sixty-five respondents (from all
levels of managemen t), observations of budget
meetings and informal discussions related to
budgets (over an 18-month period) and the
analvsis of arch iva] records (developmen ts,
strat~gies, accounting systems and budgeting),
cO\'ering more than 30 years.
The study was informed by insights offered
by the symbolic interactionist approach (Blumer
1969). The principle of content analysis was
adoptt'd and the model proposed by Pettigrew
(1983, 1990) was used in the presentation of
findings. Explanations of changes and the change
process of the organization being studied were
framed by linking both the vertical (or multi-
level) and horizontal (or process) analysis and
located in the past,- present and future events
related to both strategic and operational
management decisions. Finally, interpretations
and conjectures about changes and the dynamics
and the process of change were provided by
drawing upon rationales offered by economic,
organizational and sociological perspectives.
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The IndejJPIulent :relevision Industry in the UK
Commercial television (known in Britain as
independent television or lTV) was established
in 1954 as an alternative to the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). It was felt that
a rival to the BBC would be good for both the
country and the public as it would encourage
competition, improve technological pmgress and
raise broadcasting standards. In short, the public
would be better served by the spirit of free
enterprise.
The Independent Television Authority (ITA)
was set up as the regulatory body responsible for
commercial broadcasting. It appointed
independent contractors to supply it with
programmes for transmission. Broadcasting was
regionalized and transmission in each region was
franchised to a different contractor. Initially, there
were 4 contractors; this later increased to 16. The
Authority is now also operating a second channel,
Channel 4, which transmits nation-wide.
These contractors have fixed-term contracts.
They earn their income from the sale of
advertising air time in their franchise region. In
turn, they are required to pay rentals to ITA
(besides corporate taxes and the levy -
secondary tax - on advertising revenue). They
are also required to produce programmes for
transmission in their respective franchise regions.
All except one also contribute, to a varying
degree, to a pool of programmes to be broadcast
nationally. Their share of this pool is based on
their percentage of the total advertising revenue.
Franchise renewals are mostly made after an
in-depth study conducted by a government-
appointed committee of enquiry. The latest, in
1985, was the Peacock Commission which
reconunended that the next franchises (in 1991)
be awarded through competiti\'e tendering and
that sponsorship of programmes be allowed.
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The proposal came at the time the government
was planning to allow satellite and cable
broadcasting, reflecting a shift in government
policy towards deregulation.
Till' COlllj}{/I1Y
The company was set up in 1954, as a wholly-
ownerl subsidiary of a large entertainment
establishment, to bid for the franchise ofone of
the four original regions. It won, and began
operations in 1956. Its franchise was renewed in
1964 and again in 1967, though it lost half of its
franchise region due to a new boundary
arrangement. It contract was further renewed in
1974, 1976, 1979 and J982. The latest franchise
was valid until the end of 1992.
Initially, its core business was programme
transmission but this later changed to
programme production. The company was
organized functionally. Responsibilities were
delegated to department heads in charge of
programme production, sales of ad\'ertising air
time, public relations, financial management and
administrative and production support services.
Programmes and advertisements were seen as
'products' the company needed to fill
transmission air time. Programmes had to be
produced (or bought) for transmission to fulfil
franchise requirements, whilst advertisements
lI'ere needed to provide income to the company.
The company was reorganized in J987. The
(air time) sales and public relations functions
were merged to form a nell' division,
Broadcasting. The programme production and
programme sales departments were merged to
become the Production and Distribution
Division. The production support and technical
services departments were grouped to form the
Facilities Division, and the accounting, personnel
and building services departments became the
Cen tra! Services Division.
The management decided that the
Broadcasting Division was to operate the
franchise (transmitting programmes) within the
framework laid down by the government. This
meant that its major responsibilities wel'e to
supply and to transmit an agreed schedule of
programmes and to sell advertising air time. It
was also decided that the di\'ision was to buy all
programmes to be transmitted for the Production
and Distribution Division, and to pay a fee for
the use of all technical facilities in the
transmission of programmes to the Facilities
Division. The Production and Distl-ibution
Division was also made responsible for the
mal-keting of all the company's programmes to
national and international markets, and to exploit
programme-making skills to earn profit. The
Facilities Division was to own all physical
resources (transmission, engineering, technical
and studio facilities) and the personnel involved
to generate revenue for the company.
Several new appointments were made in the
restnlcturing process. Each division had its own
head. Financial controllers for the company and
for each of the divisions were also appoin ted. To
assist in the administration and financial
management of the divisions, commercial
managers were appointed (4 in the P"oduction
and Distribution Division and I in the Facilities
Division).
MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF
THE COMPANY
Thp Ea]"()' Ym]"s
There are three major reasons to suggest that, in
the early years of its establishment, the company
relied on culture and rules as the bases of
control. Firstly, the company was established
nearly 40 years after the BBe. So the culture
established by the BBC was extended over to the
company. Four main features existing then are
examples.
First, in the early years, programme makers
monopolized the management of the company
and occupied top positions in the administrative
hierarchy. The chief executive and the m<~ority
of the top management were once programme
makers. This led to the second featllre -
programme makers became the dominant
occupational group and programme making
became the focus of organizational activity, a
fact acknowledged by the company when it stated
(as its corporate mission) that it was the aim of
the company 'to make television wonh watching'.
The Chairman, in his 1971 financial report,
said: 'In view of the wide discussion about lTV's
record and the quality of its programmes,
perhaps, I might re-affirm our own programme
philosophy. Blending the claims of entertainment
and social responsibility in our programmes is as
much our object today as it was when we first
began transmission nearly sixteen years ago'.
The third feature was the absence of any
effort or mechanism to march revenue and costs
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of programme production. Because programmes
were made to 'tit int:o a time-table set for
transmission', they were not produced with an
expressed aim of generating income for the
company. Rather, their production was deemed
necessary to enable the company to earn revenue
through the sales of advertising air time. As
such, no serious efforts were initiated and no
proper financial control mechanisms were
in\'ented to specifically control costs of
programmes. This perhaps explains the fourth
feature - that many programmes were
completed even if their costs were \'ery much
ahove the original estimate. Although the nOnllal
explanation that not continuing with them would
he a waste of money was valid, it cannot be
denied that the influence of BBCs programme
making ethos (that programmes are made for
their entertainment, educational and
information value) was partly to blame.
The second feature of the early control
base was the monopolistic conditions within
lTV. Even though the contract required franchise
holders to operate independently of each other,
financial difficulties in the early years of
operations forced the original contractors to co-
operate to sUI-vive and to compete effecti\'elv
with the BSe. The company made large profits
from the hoom of ach'ertising reven ue in the
late 1950s and the early 1960s, removing the
need for stringent rules to control the production
costs of programmes.
Finally, hecause the Act prohibited linkages
hetween programme making and advertising
and vice versa, these two functions were
separated. As such, the need to know programme
costs (from periodic reporting) came from
management prudence and not from the need
to match costs with revenue. Thus there were no
efforts to find out whether or not a progl-amme
was profitable. The management relied upon
the accepted belief that programme makers
would not spend unnecessarily. Rules were
maintainec1 (e.g., the presentation of rough
estimates before a programme was produced)
only to the extent needed to regulate and
maintain some order in the use of resources. In
short, they relied on culture, and to an extent
on rules, for control.
TlIll1sil ion Pniorl (/964-1984)
The period hetween 1964 and 1984 can be
described as a period of transition. The
domination culture and rules continued but
were tilted towards the latter. During this period,
programme making remained the core activity
and the company's organizational and investment
efforts continued to be made to support
programme-making operations. However,
financial mechanisms became more prominent.
Financial reporting and budgeting began to be
more widely used because of the introduction of
the levy (an additional tax based on advertising
revenue earned) in 1964. Since the company
was responsible for paying this additional tax to
the Exchequer, it began to inspect its accounts
and records. A computer was installed in 1968
and the financial accounting systems were
mechanized. As a result, reporting became easier
and periodic financial reporting became more
regular. Budgeting and cost control were slowly
developed and rules increasingly became a base
for its management control system.
This increasing reliance on rules and the
emergence of some form of market-based control
began to develop and became more prominent
in the early 1980s. The establishment of Channel
4- to operate the second lTV channel, the
introduction of satellite and cable television and
the increasing number of franchise holders
meant that competition for advertising revenue
became stiffer and the company's share of the
networked programmes was reduced. On the
other hand, wi th more broadcasters, more
markets for both new and old programmes were
created. Thus there was pressure on the company
to explore these new opportunities in order to
increase 01- maintain its profitability.
In 1984, the Financial Director introduced
a new budgeting system in planning for a new
production. The aim was to enable the company
to know the full cost of making a programme.
Prior to this, budget estimates were based only
on the variable costs, which were usually based
on the amount of cash expenditure to be
incurred. The costs of using internal facilities
and labour were not accounted for and hence
became company, rather than programme,
overheads. \'\lith this new system, known as the
total costing system (TCS), programme makers
were required to prepare their programme
budgets based on the full costs. This meant that
they were also required to estimate indirect costs
such as crewing, the use of equipment and other
overheads associated with the production of a
programme.
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Perhaps the increasecluse of budgets in the
TCS, and hence greater reliance on rules carne
about because of the changing nature of the
environment in which the company operated.
The long-held belief that programme makers
could be J'elied upon to make sound financial
judgements was no longer appropriate under
the new conditions. To break away from this less
financially biased ciecision-making culture, the
management had to rely on rules, through
greater use of financial mechanisms such as
budgeti ng.
PI'110d oj C!l.al1{;1) (1984-1990)
The introduction of the TCS marked another
shift in the company's management control
s\·stem. a move towards a greater reliance on
rules and, later, on markets. Three major events
support this observation. First, the establishment
of Channel 4 coincided with the first finn
indication of the government's plan to allow for
cable and satellite broadcasting. In addition, to
implement its new franchise and to accommodate
increased programme commitments which
accompanied the establishment of Channel 4,
the company had to build more regional centres,
straining its economic resources further. These
forced the company to be more financial- and
market-oriented and to look for ways to expand
its revenue base. It set up a working party in
19H2 to study the viability of cable television
(but later decided against bidding for it). In
1984, a new working committee was formed to
evaluate the viability of satellite broadcasting. It
decided to become inmlved by joining a
consortium \\'hich was finally awarded the
franchise in 1986. Finally, divisions were allowed
to look outside for business so as to exploit
productive capacities of assets for additional
income and profit.
These events led the company to develop a
more financial orientation in its decision-making
process. Even though their mission was still 'to
make television worth watching', the need to
know more about costs was no longer for reasons
of prudence, but because it was necessary to
make profit from programmes.
Second, efforts to promote enhanced
awareness of costs or more 'budget-conscious
managers' (Hopwood 1974) (through TCS) \I'ere
complemented by the appointments of financially
trained commercial managers and the creation
of independent profit centres through
diivisionalization in ] 987. As a result, the whole
accounting system, including budgets and
budgeting processes, became more Ol-ganized,
formalized and, slowly, institutionalized. For
example, budgets became the only means of
getting funds to make programmes. As a result,
the process of preparing programme budgets
became more standardized and heavily
supervised. Programme makers had to adhere to
strict budgeting and programme making
procedures. Most, if not all, have begun to accept
this as something 'normal', suggesting that rules
have been successfully used by the management
to control behaviour so that members' goals are
in congruence with those of the company.
Market-based control can also be observed from
incl'eased reliance on budgets and budgeting
processes as a means to bargain for resources.
Reliance on markets as the basis for control
can also be seen in the third event, the
restructuring carried out in 1987. The company
decentralized its operations, making each division
an autonomous responsibility (profit) centre.
Increased reliance on market l_:'.~~J control can
be observed from the introduction and the use
of transfer prices to account for inter-divisional
transactions. Management's decision that the
Pl-oduction and Distribution Division must pay
the Facilities Division for the use of equipment
supplied by the latter for making programmes
demonstrated efforts by the company to create
in ternal markets and thereby rely on the market
rules of supply and demand as another base of
its management control system.
However, it has to be reiterated that,
although these events suggest that markets seem
to be the base of control, there is no evidence to
suggest that rules and cultures were absent and
that the company did not benefit from having
people following rules and administrative
procedures (such as in preparing budgets) and
relying on commonly shared values long
established in the television industry - such as
the ethos that programmes must have
entertainment, educational and information
values. Hence, it could only be suggested that,
in the 1980s, markets overtook culture and, to a
certain extent, rules, as the most dominan t
element in the company's MCS.
DISCUSSION
Evidence from this case study shows that the
MCS of the company evolved from greater
(iO Perl<ll1ibJ Soc. Sci. &: Hum. Vo!. 3 No.1 199:i
The En,hnioll or Rnlcs. Markets ann Cnlwre-b<lsed Control in an Org-ani/.ational Setting
reliance on culture then on rules and finally on
markets. This, at a glance, seems to be in contrast
to the suggestion made by Lebas and 'Neigenstein
that the direction would be towards the lessening
of importance of J'ule-based controls and towards
greater reliance on control imbedded in the
organizational culture.
A possible explanation for this is that the
evohltion in the iVICS as Lebas and Weigenstein
had proposed may occur only in situations where
organizations are adapting or reacting in
response to a changing environment, which,
indeed, requires flexibility which rule-based
control strategy would not allow. However, in
this case SlUC"', post-I 980 events suggest that the
company seems to have embarked on planned
change Thus changes initiated or implemented
(such as the introduction of the TCS and
divisionalization) were based on the possibility
that the company might not win the renewal of
its franchise. So actions taken by the management
were dcsigns to O\'ercome perceived threats
rather than opportunistic responses to immediate
problems. Under such conditions, the
management must reI\' on all the three elements
of control - market, rules and culture. But
mles and markets seem to have the biggest
impact.
Perhaps rule- and market-based control
were more appropriate because 'the old way of
doing things' (neither financial- nor budget-
conscious culture) could not be relied upon to
make the companv better able to compete and
face the uncertain future. As Greiner (1967,
1972) suggested, events leading to the
establishment of Channel 4 and the
i11lroduction of cable and satellite broadcasting
could have brought pressures on the
managemcnt which led them to see the need
f()r change. The setting lip of special committees
in 1982 and 1984 (to study the viability of cable
and satellite broadcasting respectively) and the
introduction of a nell' budgeting system (TeS)
"'ere interventions made to demonstrate the
seriousness of the management in meeting those
perceived threats (pressures) and thereby giving
the message that changes were necessary.
Because these pressures were related to the
profitability position of the company, the old
bclief that programme making should best be
left to programme makers could not be
relied.upon. Hcnce, rules and markets were
seen as the best mcans of instilllting control.
On the other hand, it could be suggested
that, based on 'Nithane's (1988) conclusion, in
the early years the company could have played a
more passive role and was operating to defend
its regulatory activities. But once established, the
company began to develop its own market niche.
As such, the involveme11l of the company with
t.he ot.her original contractors in the early days
of its operat.ion and the int.roduct.ion of
networked programmes could be seen as efforts
by the company to employ defensive and, later,
co-operative strat.egies. In the 1960s and 1970s,
the company grew and was able to perceive it.s
environment. better. As such, its expansion in
other entertainment business reflected its
adoption of a growth strategy. Finally, the
company became more analytical as the need
arose for it to maintain stability within the
industry. From control viewpoints, t.his evolution
has also demonstrated the emergence of new
bases of control. Initially, because of the need to
establish itself and to command a competitive
edge, the company embarked on finding a niche
as a programme maker. To allow th is to happen,
it had to rely on the norms and commonly held
beliefs of the time. Once this was achieved, the
company turned to rule-based control so that its
programme making activities could then be seen
from the perspective of a commercial concern.
Finally, after being around for over thirty years,
the company had made a name for itself and
was poised for a much greater challenge.
Diversification into other areas of the
entertainment industry became more urgent
because it could lose its franchise. 'nder such
circumstances, market-based control seemed a
logical choice.
However, there is also a second explanation
for this de·elopment. The evolution described
above can also be viewed as a shift, not from
greater reliance on culture to rule-based control
and finally to market-based control, but as -an
emergence of new forms of cultural patterns as
nell' knowledge is created and diffused within
the organization, as suggested by Boisot (1986:
1~7-1~8): ' ... a choice to internalise orexternalise
a transaction, is not a choice in favour of markets,
hierarchies, or other co-ordinating mechanisms.
[n effects, an organisation makes two
interdependent decisions: the first concerns the
institutional form of transaction, the second is
style, Organisational culture then emerges [rom
our analysis as a configuration of transactions,
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both internal and external, that result from the
interplay of these two sets of decisions.'
Seen in this perspective, the limited tenure
of the franchise, the uncertainty of retaining it,
gradual reductions in guaranteed transmission
slots (in networked programmes) and the
introduction and establishment of Channel 4
and cable and satellite broadcasting could have
been the common knowledge that was codif:ied
and diffused, and gave rise to concerns over
the company's future competitive advantage.
The introduction of the nell' accounting and
budgeting system (TCS) formalized the
codification and diffusion, leading members to
see the need to find new organizational
arrangements. The fact that the new strategy
(of relying more on accounting and budgeting
systems) to control expenditures was task
related, meanings got created and new shared
"alues - to be more financially conscious -
emerged.
This second explanation seems to support
Lebas and \Neigenstein's argument - that in
greater uncertainty, an organization will rely
more on a control system-based culture. However,
it must be noted that there is a major
epistemological difference between the argument
of Lebas and Weigenstein and that of Boisot. In
the former, culture is seen as independent in its
own right and manifests different characteristics
from markets or rules. Thus controls based on
culture produce different results from controls
based on markets or rules. Boisot's argument is
based on the premise that markets and rules are
possible transactional outcomes which are rooted
in culture. As such, markets and rules are cultural
trailS of an organization which has emerged
from the process of interdependent choice -
institutional form and style.
CONCLUSION
This paper seeks to answer the question of how
the bases on which the management control
system of an organization have changed over
time. \'Ve provided evidence to show that the
company's MCS shifted from reliance on culture
to rules, and finally to markets, as the base for
control, which seems to contrast with Lebas and
v"eigenstein's argument that the reverse should
occur. We suggested that this might be due to
the fact that changes initiated by the company
were planned in anticipation of non-renewal of
its broadcasting franchise, and not as reactive
measures to overcome eXlstmg problems. The
management relied on rule- and market-based
con trol because it decentralized into autonomous
divisions, each with missions and objectives to
meet. Controls imbedded in the organizational
culture, although present, were overshadowed
by the former.
On the other hand, we also argued that Lebas
and Weigenstein could have been right in their
argument that an organization will rely more on
a control system that is embedded in its culture
in response to a more uncertain and competitive
environment. But, for this to stand, we have to
view adherence to rules and market-driven
con troIs as two features or facets of the company's
existing culture.
These rather contrasting explanations came
about because they were based on a different
epistemological stance, giving rise to different
interpretations of the word 'culture'. Other than
a common notion that 'culture is a system of
shared meanings', Smircich (1983) and Allaire
and Firsirotll (1984) have shown that culture has
different meanings to diffc. _." schools of
thought.
The implications of these findings are
sign ifican t. Irrespective of wh ich viewpoi n ts we
subscribe to, they sholl' that accounting can be
an important change agent and catalyst. However,
to be effective, the existing power structure needs
to be reoriented (in the case of the company, by
divisionalization). From the control perspective,
the findings suggest that an organization must
rely more on rules and markets and less on
cuI ture-based controls if it wants to successfully
implement a planned change as the realization
that something must be done does not guarantee
that members understand the problem and want
to change. They may need to be 'pressured' or
'shaken' so that they understand the need for
change.
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